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expected solely from the efforts of others, but since its resolution of this
issue was merely dicta, 55 lower courts need not follow the Court's analysis.
Moreover, the Court's decision can be read narrowly to leave the lower
courts with the recurring task of defining a security.'56
JOHN

J.

EKLUND

II. CONFLICTING STANDARDS OF LIABILITY IN
SHORT FORM REGISTRATION: THE UNDERWRITER'S
DILEMMA
As a result of administrative action by the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC), the reporting requirements of the Securities Act of
1933' ('33 Act) and the Securities Exchange Act of 19342 ('34 Act) constitute a continuous disclosure system of corporate, financial and managerial
information. 3 Form S-16 integrates the registration provisions of the '33
'5 See note 151 supra.
156By analyzing SEC interpretations of the Securities Acts and past actions of Congress,
see text accompanying notes 56-75 supra, the Court implied that if either had indicated the
propriety of applying the Acts in the Daniel context, it may have deferred to congressional
or administrative judgment. 99 S. Ct. at 798-801. The Court also held that adequate regulation of pension plans under ERISA obviates the need for additional federal controls. See text
accompanying notes 78-81 supra. Courts therefore may be justified in extending the provisions of the Seturities Acts to transactions that are not subject to more detailed federal
regulation. In addition, the Court specifically limited its holding in Danielto the applicability
of the Acts to compulsory, noncontributory pension plans. 99 S. Ct. at 802. Courts addressing
other financial schemes in future cases might avoid resolving the conflicts between Daniel
and the Court's prior decisions by finding factual distinctions that justify a departure from
Daniel's analysis. See, e.g., Tanuggi v. Grolier, Inc., [Current] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
96,880 (S.D.N.Y. 1979). In Tanuggi, the Court held that a voluntary contributory pension
plan was not a security. Noting the myriad questions Daniel left unanswered, id. at 95,607,
the court concluded that the Grolier Plan did not meet Howey's "expectation of profit"
element. Id. at 95,608. Unlike the plan addressed in Daniel, see text accompanying note 17
supra, an employee's pension benefits under the Grolier Plan varied according to his number
of years of service and his highest average salary over a five year period. Id. at 95,607.
Moreover, the Grolier Plan provided that employer contributions would compensate for
amounts by which the Plan's current assets fell short of the level necessary to meet fixed
benefit payments. Id. at 95,608. Since qualified participants received the same level of benefits whether or not the Plan's Trustees invested assets successfully, the Grolier Plan did not
create an expectation of profit from the Trustees' efforts. Id. Notwithstanding the Tanuggi
court's pronouncements to the contrary, its analysis of the Grolier Plan under Howey's
"expectation of profit" element differs significantly from that employed by the Daniel Court.
In Daniel, the Court recognized that the pension benefits in question may have had security
characteristics, see text accompanying note 39 supra, but held that the non-security elements
of Daniel's compensation package characterized his relationship with his employers. See text
accompanying notes 38-42 supra.

1 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1976).
2 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk (1976).
1 See Bialkin, The Issuer Registration and DistributionProvisions of the ProposedFederal Securities Code, 30 VAND. L. REV. 327, 331 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Bialkin]. Since
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Act with the reporting requirements of the '34 Act by incorporating by
reference '34 Act documents into a registration statement.4 Recently, the
extension of Form S-16 to primary offerings has rekindled underwriters'
concerns as to their'civil liability under section 11 of the '33 Act.' These
concerns originate from an uncertainty regarding the extent of investigation underwriters must undertake to verify information in '34 Act documents which have been incorporated by reference into registration statements on Form S-16.1 Under the present Acts, individuals preparing '34
Act documents are subject to a lesser standard of liability than persons
preparing a '33 Act registration statement.7 Many underwriters object to
the application of the more stringent liability of the '33 Act to documents
incorporated by reference on Form S-16.8 Thus, the SEC's endeavor to
reduce registration time and costs by the use of a short form for the registration of securities on Form S-16 creates a practical dilemma for underwriters attempting to avoid section 11 liability
Exemption from full registration under the '33 Act is based on the
assumption that '34 Act materials filed by an issuer can adequately furnish
disclosure information required by both acts. 10 As a result of the 1964
amendments to the '34 Act, corporations are subject to continuous reporting provisions either through an initial public distribution of securities or
by compliance with the requirements of shareholder participation and
asset size specified in the '34 Act." Form S-16 is premised on the availabilthe enactment of § 12(g) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 781(g) (1976),
the SEC has adopted numerous amendments to Exchange Act forms to integrate their disclosure requirements with the disclosure provisions of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§
77a-77aa (1976). 1 REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMrrrEE ON CORPORATE DISCLOSURE TO THE
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION 425-26 (November 3, 1977) [hereinafter cited as
ADVISORY REPORT].

43 Fed. Reg. 16,672, 16,677 (1978) (to be codified in 17 C.F.R. § 239.27) [hereinafter
cited as Form S-16]; see text accompanying notes 12-20 infra.
15 U.S.C. § 77k (1976); see text accompanying notes 35-39 infra. Effective May 30,
1978, the SEC extended the availability of the short form for registration, Form S-16, supra
note 4, to primary offerings of certain issuers. SEC Securities Act Release No. 33-5923 (April
11, 1978), reprinted in [Current] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 81,561, at 80,243 [hereinafter
cited as Release 33-5923]. A summary of underwriters' concerns and the response of the SEC
may be found in SEC Securities Act Release No. 33-5998 (Nov. 17, 1978), reprinted in
[Current] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 81,761, at 81,056 [hereinafter cited as Release 335998]. See text accompanying notes 49-64 infra.

See text accompanying notes 49-64 infra.
Compare '34 Act § 18, 15 U.S.C. § 78r (1976) with '33 Act § 11, 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1976).
See text accompanying notes 21-27 infra.
See text accompanying notes 49-60 infra.
See ALI FEDERAL SECURITIES CODE, comment 10(a) at 104 (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1973);
text accompanying notes 49-64 infra.
" See Knauss, DisclosureRequirements- Changing Concepts of Liability, 24 Bus. LAw.
43, 47 (1968). One commentator has suggested that the larger reservoir of continuously updated information accumulated under the '34 Act might be substituted for the sporadic and
often duplicative information disclosed in '33 Act registration statements. See Cohen, "Truth
in Securities" Revisited, 79 HARv. L. REV. 1340 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Cohen].
"1 See Bialkin, supra note 3, at 331. Section 12(g) of the '34 Act extended the continuous
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ity of a significant body of disclosure material provided under the '34 Act,
which need not be repeated in a '33 Act registration statement.'2 A prospectus 3 prepared pursuant to Form S-16 is required to contain only limited
information concerning the identity of the issuer, the description of the
securities to be offered, the plan of distribution, and the use of the proceeds.' 4 Basic disclosure of information about the business, management
and financial operations of the issuer is included through incorporation by
reference of '34 Act reports in the registration statement.'5 In addition, the
prospectus must describe any material changes in the issuer's affairs which
have occurred since the end of the latest fiscal year and which have not
been previously reported.'" The abbreviated registration form of S-16 may
be used for certain offerings of securities by companies which meet the
requirements for use of Form S-7.' 7 Initially available only for secondary
reporting provisions of the Act to issuers not listed on any major exchange whose total assets
exceeded $1 million and who had a class of equity securities held of record by at least five
hundred persons. 15 U.S.C. § 781(g)(1) (1976).
12 ADvisoRY REPORT, supra note 3, at 424-25.
,3 A prospectus is defined as "any prospectus, notice, circular, advertisement, letter or
communication . . . which offers any security for sale or confirms the sale of any security."
'33 Act § 2(10), 15 U.S.C. § 77b(10) (1976).
11SEC Securities Act Release No. 33-5879 (Nov. 9, 1977), reprinted in [1977] SEc. REG.
& L. REP. (BNA), No. 427, at H-i; Form S-16 (Part I - Information Required in Prospectus),
supra note 4.
,5 In light of the experience of S-7 short form registration, the Wheat Report recommended that the scope of the prospectus be reduced for certain companies to cover only
essential disclosures that relate to the plan of distribution. The Report suggested that the
prospectus should contain an appropriate legend referring to the issuer's reports and proxy
statements filed under the '34 Act and informing the reader how to obtain them. DiSCLOSURE
TO INVESTORS: A REAPPRAISAL OF FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE POLICIES UNDER THE '33 AND '34 AcM
68 (1969) [hereinafter cited as THE WHEAT REPORT].
The SEC adopted the Wheat Report recommendations in Form S-16. The issuer must
incorporate by reference into the Form S-16 prospectus its latest annual report filed pursuant
to the '34 Act or its latest prospectus filed under the '33 Act, all other reports filed pursuant
to the Exchange Act since the end of the most recent fiscal year, its proxy statement for the
most recent annual meeting, and any subsequent proxy statement. See Form S-16 (Item 7),
supra note 4.
" See Form S-16 (Item 8), supra note 4.
1 See Form S-16 (Rule as to use of Form S-16), supra note 4. Generally, a registrant may
utilize Form S-7 if: (1) the registrant has a class of securities registered pursuant to § 12 of
the '34 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 781 (1976), or is required to file reports pursuant to § 15(d) of the
'34 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78o(d) (1976); (2) the registrant has been subject to the requirements of
§ § 12 or 15(d), and has filed all applicable reports for thirty-six calendar months prior to the
filing of the registration statement; (3) the registrant has not defaulted in payments on
preferred stock, indebtedness for borrowed money or long term leases during the past thirtysix month§; and (4) the registrant has a consolidated net income of at least $250,000 for three
of the last four fiscal years, including the most recent year. 17 C.F.R. § 239.26 (1978) (Rule
as to use of Form S-7).
Form S-7 entitles an issuer with a substantial history of reporting under the '34 Act to
omit certain information required in a Form S-1 registration statement since such information already is available to the investing public. ADVISORY REPORT, supra note 3, at 423-24. A
Form S-7 registrant is not required to describe its business history or properties or to provide
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offerings of securities, the SEC in 1978 extended the availability of Form
S-16 to the registration of primary offerings of debt and equity.' To use
S-16 for primary offerings, the issuer must have outstanding voting securities with a minimum market value of $50 million'9 and a firm commitment
20
underwriting of not less than ninety percent of the securities offered.
The basic effect of incorporation by reference is to subject '34 Act filings
to the disclosure standards of the '33 Act. 21 Disclosure in '34 Act documents, however, generally has been less complete and less accurate than
disclosure in '33 Act prospectuses.2 2 In addition, substantive review by the
SEC of '34 Act filings is less thorough and prompt than the processing of
registration statements under the '33 Act and proxy statements under the
'34 Act.23 Moreover, the liability provisions of the '34 Act do not have the
in terrorem effect of the severe sanctions of the '33 Act which demand care
and responsibility in the preparation of registration statements." Under
section 18 of the '34 Act,23 liability is imposed upon persons who make or
information about its management. The SEC reasoned that adequate disclosure in these
specific areas could be assumed to have been made in reports and proxy statements filed over
the years pursuant to the '34 Act by the class of companies eligible to use the new form. THE
WHEAT REPORT, supra note 15, at 74-75.
," See Release 33-5923, supra note 5. The SEC maintains that Form S-16 should be
available for the primary offerings of a "small top tier of companies . . . which usually
provide high quality corporate communication documents, including 1934 Act reports, and
whose corporate information is widely disseminated" because "members of this class of
registrants are widely followed by debt and equity analysts." Id. at 80,246; ADVISORY REPORT,
supra note 3, at 433-34. In addition, the availability of Form S-16 has been extended to the
registration of offerings to certain existing security holders, and to offerings under certain

conditions to holders of outstanding convertible securities or outstanding transferable warrants. See Release 33-5923, supra note 5.
1, Form S-16 (Rule as to use of Form S-16), supra note 4. In addition to the wide
dissemination of information concerning companies of the required size, the SEC believes
that the $50 million market capitalization standard adds assurance that securities analysts
will follow such companies. See Release 33-5923, supra note 5, at 80,246.
21 Form S-16 (Rule as to the use of Form S-16), supra note 4; see Release 33-5923, supra
note 5, at 80,247. In a firm commitment underwriting, an underwriter agrees to purchase the
proposed public issue regardless of whether or not it can sell the entire issue to the public.
Such an agreement involves the greatest risk to an underwriter. See G. ROBINSON & K.
EPPLER, GOING PUsLC: SUCCESSFUL SECURITES UNDERWRITING § 22 (1976) [hereinafter cited
as G. ROBINSON & K. EPPLER].
21 See ADvISORY REPORT, supra note 3, at 451; Release 33-5998, supra note 5, at 81,058.
12 ADVISORY REPORT, supra note 3, at 426. See generally Cohen, supra note 9, at 1353-72.
Various commentators, as well as the SEC, have recognized that integration by short form
registration procedures, which permit incorporation by reference of '34 Act reports, must be
conditioned on the improved quality and dissemination of disclosures in periodic reports. See,
e.g., AnvisoRY REPORT, supra note 3, at 425-26; THE WHEAT REPORT, supra note 15, at 67;
BarChris: A Dialogue on a Bad Case Making Hard Law, 57 GEO. L.J. 221, 248 (1968) (remarks
of D. Schwartz) [hereinafter cited as BarChris Dialogue].
n See Cohen, supra note 10, at 1362, 1368-72. See also ADVISORY REPORT, supra note 3,
at 426-27.
"

See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 10, at 1355, 1361; ADVISORY

text accompanying notes 35-39 infra.

15 U.S.C. § 78r (1976).

REPORT,

supra note 3, at 426;
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cause to be made a misstatement in a document filed under the '34 Act
and who act in bad faith or have knowledge of the misrepresentations. 2 In
contrast, the '33 Act establishes, without regard to knowledge or bad faith,
an obligation of inquiry upon all participants in the registration process. 2
Accordingly, the SEC has reasoned that incorporation by reference of '34
Act documents into registration statements on Form S-16 should improve
the quality of disclosure in '34 Act filings. 2s Concern about liability under
the '33 Act for the content of incorporated '34 Act filings would demand
increased care in preparation of these reports by underwriters. 29 In addition, the underwriters' financial interest in a firm commitment offering
helps assure adequate inquiry into '34 Act documents incorporated by
reference."
Underwriters have asserted that the intermixing of the securities registration requirements of the '33 Act with the periodic reporting requirements of the '34 Act in Form S-16 creates inherently different responsibilities in the preparation of a registration statement." As a result, they contend that the measure of underwriter liability in the use of Form S-16
should reflect the changed circumstances.2 Underwriters have requested
that the SEC delineate the steps necessary to fulfill the underwriters' '33
Act obligations and to avoid section 11 liability for material misstatements
or omissions in the information contained in the S-16 and the documents
incorporated by referenceY
The primary function of section 11 of the '33 Act 34 is to promote enforcement of the '33 Act and to deter negligence through the in terrorem nature
of the liabilities. 5 Section 11 holds various participants in the registration
26Id. A person seeking civil remedy under § 18 must establish that he did not know that
the statement in question was false or misleading. Further, he must prove that in reliance
upon such statement he purchased or sold a security at a price which was affected by such

statement. Id.
21See text accompanying notes 35-39 infra.
21See Release 33-5998, supra note 5, at 81,058; Release 33-5923, supra note 5, at 80,246.
n See Release 33-5998, supra note 5, at 81,058; Release 33-5923, supra note 5, at 80,246.
10See Release 33-5923, supra note 5, at 80,247; text ccompanying notes 40-48 infra.
31 See, e.g., Letter from Securities Industry Association to SEC (Jan. 24, 1979) (SEC File
No. S7-763)[hereinafter cited as SIA]; text accompanying notes 49-59 infra.
32

Id.

See generally Release 33-5998, supra note 5, at 81,059.
15 U.S.C. § 77k (1976).
3 See Globus v. Law Research Serv., Inc., 418 F.2d 1276, 1288 (2d Cir. 1969), cert.
denied, 397 U.S. 913 (1970); SEC Securities Act Release No. 33-5275 (July 26, 1972), reprinted
in 1 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 4506B, at 4055 [hereinafter cited as Release 33-5275]. The
purpose of the '33 Act is to protect the investor by requiring "full disclosure of every important
element attending the issue of a new security." H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 3
[hereinafter cited as HousE REPORT]. Theoretically, disclosure may deter questionable business practices and, concomitantly, have the prophylactic effect of promoting business integrity. The primary purpose of disclosure is to enable investors to arrive at independent decisions based upon access to adequate information. See THE WHEAT REPORT, supra note 15, at
10, 52-53. See also Feit v. Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp., 332 F. Supp. 544, 563-64
(E.D.N.Y. 1971). Although an investor rarely will be able to assimilate the mass of informa-
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process, including officers, directors, and underwriters, responsible for an
untrue statement of a material fact or an omission of a material fact in the
registration statement. 6 The participants are liable to a purchaser "not
only if they cannot prove that they did not know of the flaw in the information offered the public but also if they cannot prove that they could not
have found the flaw 'after reasonable investigation' and that they 'had
reasonable ground to believe and did believe' "the adequacy and accuracy
of the statements at the time the registration statement became effective.37
Underwriters, however, are not required to guarantee the absolute accuracy of every statement.8 Instead, an underwriter must prove that he has
conducted a due*diligence investigation. If an underwriter can establish
that he had exercised reasonable care in verifying the statements contained in the prospectus, the underwriter can avoid section 11 liability.:9
An underwriter, however, derives little guidance from the '33 Act as to the
extent and intensity of review or inspection necessary to perform a reasonable investigation which will avoid liability for misstatements or omissions.
The consideration and development of relevant factors in determining
tion in the registration statement, he will be influenced by experts such as brokers, bankers
and investment advisers whose judgment will be reflected in the market price. In addition,
the need to report complicated business facts must be balanced with the need to inform
average investors of special factors, such as the speculative nature of the securities. See
Douglas, Protectingthe Investors, 23 YALE REv. 508, 523-24 (1933); THE WHEAT REPORT, supra
note 15, at 52-53. The obligation to make full and accurate disclosure is enforced by the
imliosition of the standards of trusteeship: "all those responsible for statements upon the face
of which the public is solicited to invest its money shall be held to standards like those
imposed by law upon a fiduciary." HousE REPORT, supra, at 9.
u 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a). Section 11(a) of the '33 Act provides in part:
[i]n case any part of the registration statement, when such part became effective;
contained an untrue statement of a material fact or omitted to state a material fact
required to be stated therein or necessary to make the statements therein not
misleading, any person acquiring such security (unless it is proved that at the time
of such acquisition he knew of such truth or omission) may ...
sue ....
Id. If the registration statement is defective, under § 11 a purchaser need not establish
reliance upon the misstatement or omission. Liability is imposed substantially without regard
to the registrants' intention or knowledge of the misstatement or omission. See id.
17HousE REPORT, supra note 35, at 9. A participant may establish a defense under §
11(b)(3)(A) only if
he had, after reasonable investigation, reasonable ground to believe and did believe,
at the time such part of the registration statement became effective, that the
statements therein were true and that there was no omission to state a material fact
required to be stated therein or necessary to make the statements therein not
misleading ....

15 U.S.C. § 77k(b)(3)(A) (1976).
HousE REPORT, supra note 35, at 9; see Release 33-5275, supra note 35, at 4055.
3' See text accompanying notes 34-37 supra; Release 33-5275, supra note 35, at 4054.
Although there is no express provision requiring an underwriter to conduct a due diligence
investigation, the underwriter's desire to avoid liability theoretically creates the incentive to
exercise the "honesty, care and competence" necessary to assure the accuracy of statements
in the registration statement. See HousE REPORT, supra note 35, at 9; Release 33-5275, supra
note 35, at 4055.
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what constitutes a reasonable investigation and a reasonable ground for
belief regarding information contained in a registration statement has been
left to the courts." The courts have emphasized the public's expectation
that an underwriter will conduct an independent investigation of the issuer
and the issue." Furthermore, because of its importance in the preparation
of an issue for market, the underwriter is the only participant, excepting
accountants, who can assume an adverse position to the company for the
10See, e.g., Feit v. Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp., 332 F. Supp. 544 (E.D.N.Y.
1971); Escott v. BarChris Constr. Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). Although the SEC
has been requested to establish factors to be considered in connection with the reasonableness
of an underwriter's inquiry, the Commission has refused to do so in abstract terms. See, e.g.,
Release 33-5998, supra note 5, at 81,060-61; cf. Release 33-5375, supra note 35 (underwriters
requested by SEC to establish standards). Noting the failure of previous attempts to standardize the elements of underwriters' due diligence obligations, the SEC has chosen to leave
such development and refinement to the courts. See Release 33-5998, supra note 5, at 81,060
& 81,061 n.19; see, e.g., ProposedArticle III, Section 35 of Rules of FairPracticeConcerning
UnderwriterInquiry and InvestigationStandardsRespecting Distributionof Issues of Securities to the Public, reprintedin Messer, Roles and Reasonable Expectations of the Underwriter, Lawyer and Independent SecuritiesAuditor in the Efficient Provisionof. Verified Information: 'Truth in Securities' Reinforced, 52 NEB. L. REV. 429, 473 (1973) [hereinafter cited
as Messer]; Israels, Checklist for Underwriter'sInvestigation, reprintedin H. WANDER & W.
GRIENENBERGER, SELECTED ARTICLEs ON FEDERAL SECURITIES LAw 65 (1968).
11See, e.g., Chris-Craft Indus., Inc, v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 480 F.2d 341, 370 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 414 U.S. 910 (1973); In re The Richmond Corp., 41 S.E.C. 398, 406 (1963). The
duty of care imposed by § 11 upon participants in a securities distribution is determined by
their importance in the distribution scheme and by the degree of protection that the public
has the right to expect because of the particular registrant's participation. See HousE REPORT,
supra note 35, at 9.
By associating itself with a proposed offering, an underwriter impliedly represents to the
investment community that the issuer meets the firm's standards, that the underwriter has
exercised diligence and care in examining the issuer's business, and that the offered securities
are suitable for public ownership. See In re The Richmond Corp., 41 S.E.C. 398, 406 (1963).
In Richmond, the issuer's prospectus failed to disclose the company's investment plans which
materially altered the nature of the investment opportunity and the attendant risks. Id. at
400-02. Furthermore, the underwriter's inexperience, a material factor bearing on the success
of the offering, was not disclosed. Id. at 403. The SEC ruled that in light of investor reliance,
failure to disclose these facts constituted material omissions. Id. The underwriter's investigation, consisting of a visit to the issuer's property, examination of the registrant's list of
stockholders and the obtaining of a credit report on the company, failed to meet the investors'
expectation of diligence and care in examining the issuer's business and accuracy of the
prospectus. Id. at 405-06; see 1 REPORT OF SPECIAL STUDY OF SEcuRrriEs MARKErS OF THE
SEcuRms AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION 493, 496, 513 (1963) [hereinafter cited as SPECIAL
REPORT].

According to the general industry view, underwriters vouch for the quality of the issuer.
A firm's reputation is risked, in some measure, on each issue it underwrites. See Folk, Civil
Liabilities Under the FederalSecurities Acts: The BarChris Case (pt. 1), 55 VA. L. REv. 1,
54 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Folk]. Furthermore, reputable underwriting firms are expected to underwrite only issues of well-established companies with substantial earnings
records. See SPEcIAL REPORT at 496, 512. Other firms, however, may be willing to underwrite
a company solely on the basis of potential profit regardless of the issuer's quality. As a result,
many investors regard the character of the underwriter as indicative of the character of the
issue. See G. ROBINSON & K. EPPLER, supra note 20, at § 21.
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purposes of the due diligence investigation.42 Under the current standard,
an underwriter must satisfy itself as to the accuracy and adequacy of the
3
representations contained in the registration statement. Thus, if underwriters were allowed to fulfill their responsibilities by mere reliance on the
representations of the issuer's management, section 11 would provide the
investor no additional protection.4 4 In order to fulfill its responsibilities to
42 See Release 33-5275, supra note 35, at 4055; Escott v. BarChris Constr. Corp., 283 F.

Supp. 643, 696 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). In an action brought under § 11 of the '33 Act, 15 U.S.C. §
77k (1976), the plaintiffs alleged that the BarChris registration statement contained material
misstatements and oiiiissions. 283 F. Supp. at 652. After consideration of the misstatements
and omissions in the prospectus, see id. at 679-80, the district court declared that disclosure
of the inaccuracies relating to the company's state of affairs immediately prior to the effective
date of the registration statement would have deterred the average prudent investor from
purchasing the offered securities. Id. at 681-82. The court held that the registrants and
underwriters had not established their affirmative defense of due diligence and, therefore,
were liable to the purchasers under § 11. Id. at 684-97. In particular, the court suggested that
the underwriters and the company's officers were in adverse positions because of the underwriters' due diligence obligations under § 11. Id. at 696. Since no fiduciary relationship
existed, the underwriter could not rely on the officers' statements. Id. The misleading statements may have been made in a self-serving attempt to induce the underwriter to underwrite
the offering. Therefore, the court found that such statements may be unduly enthusiastic or
deliberately false. See id. at 696-97.
Since the underwriter usually is not contractually committed to the underwriting until
immediately prior to the effective date of the registration statement, he should have the
leverage to demand access to records or data verifying the information contained in the
registration statement. See Release 33-5275, supra note 35, at 4055; Folk, supra note 41, at
.54-55.
1 See generally Escott v. BarChris Constr. Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643, 692-97 (S.D.N.Y.
1968); notes 44 and 45 infra. In a practical context, the primary responsibility for preparation
of the registration statement rests with the issuer. The offering company is in the best position
to know fully and present adequately the facts concerning its business and operations. See
Freund & Hacker, Cutting Up the Humble Pie: A PracticalApproach to Apportioning Litigation Risks Among Underwriters,48 ST. JoHN's L. REv. 461, 471-72 (1974). The underwriter,
however, remains responsible under § 11 for the facts contained in the registration statement
and prospectus. See, e.g., In re Charles E. Bailey & Co., 35 S.E.C. 33 (1953). In Bailey, the
defendant contended that a preliminary investigation of the issuer's affairs was sufficient to
comply with his duty as an underwriter. Furthermore, the underwriter disclaimed responsibility for the contents of the prospectus because the contents were based upon information
furnished by the issuer. Id. at 41. Bailey was aware, however, that the issuer was in bad
financial straits, that the company was attempting to finance an untried venture, and that
funds from the public offering would be consumed by overhead expenses unless the venture
was immediately successful. Id. at 41-42. The SEC ruled that such reliance on the information
furnished by the issuer did not discharge the underwriter from the duty to exercise reasonable
care to assure the substantial accuracy of representations made in the prospectus and sales
literature. Id. at 42.
11See Escott v. BarChris Constr. Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643, 697 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). In
BarChris, the underwriters regarded the prospectus as being the company's responsibility.
Id. at 696. The underwriters cited Litwin v. Allen, 25 N.Y.S.2d 667 (1940), as establishing an
analogous standard of reasonableness entitling a director of a corporation to rely upon information furnished him by the officers without independently verifying the information. 283
F. Supp. at 696. The court rejected this standard, indicating that the '33 Act makes no
distinction between the underwriters' and directors' duty under § 11 to verify information.
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the investing public, an underwriter's due diligence investigation must go
beyond and behind the representations of management in a reasonable
attempt to verify the data submitted in the registration statement.4 5 The
underwriter's investigation must focus especially on updating information
and the trends and present status of the company between the last audited
financial report and the effective date of the registration statement. 6 If the
Id. If the prospectus contained false statements, the underwriters failed to fulfill the same
responsibility as the directors. Id.
In addition, underwriters may not avoid their responsibility to prospective investors by
increasing the issuer's liability through an indemnity agreement. See Globus v. Law Research
Serv., Inc., 418 F.2d 1276 (2d Cir. 1969). Although the underwriter in Globus was guilty of
more than mere negligence, the court's reasoning is applicable to civil liability for any breach
of the § 11 standard. See id. at 1288. The court feared that an indemnified underwriter would
tend to lessen the vigor of its independent investigation. Id. Whether or not such consequences would occur, the court emphasized that the purpose of the '33 Act is to encourage
diligence, investigation and compliance with the statutory requirements by exposing issuers
and underwriters to joint liability. An exemption from such liability would be tantamount
to avoiding such responsibilities. Id. at 1289.
0 See Escott v. BarChris Constr. Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643, 696-97 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); In re
The Richmond Corp., 41 S.E.C. 398, 406 (1963); In re Charles E. Bailey & Co:, 35 S.E.C. 33,
42 (1953). In BarChris, the counsel for the lead underwriter conducting the due diligence
investigation of BarChris was aware of the importance of inspecting corporate records. Id. at
696. An inspection of the executive committee minutes would have revealed many of the
discrepancies and deficiencies in the BarChris prospectus. Id. at 695. However, counsel chose
not to investigate the composition of backlog orders, although he earlier had raised an issue
about the certainty of the figure given. Further, counsel made no investigation into the
company's cash position, despite notice of unusual conditions placed on officers' loans to the
company. The counsel chose to rely, instead, on the information received from various directors without further verification. Id. The court ruled that the underwriters must meet the
same standards of due diligence as the directors involved, id. at 696-97, and held that it is
not sufficient to ask questions and obtain answers thought to be satisfactory without seeking
to verify such answers from the corporate records. Id. at 696. Cross-examination of the issuer's
officers by the underwriter or belief in their truthfulness and reliability does not constitute a
reasonable investigation. See id. at 697. The court recognized that the limits of verification
are a matter of judgment to be determined in each case. Id. at 697; see Competitive Assocs.,
Inc. v. International Health Sciences, Inc., [1974-75 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 94,966 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (despite failure to discover conspiracy, underwriters performed necessary procedures to justify findings of due diligence). In BarChris, since the
underwriter's counsel made no attempt to verify the management's representations, the
underwriter did not establish a defense of due diligence. 283 F. Supp. at 697.
"1 See 283 F. Supp. at 681-82, 694-97; BarChris Dialogue, supra note 22, at 236 (remarks
of C. Israels). Section 11 imposes liability for misstatements or omissions as of the effective
date of the registration statement. 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a); (b)(3)(A). Therefore, the underwriter
bears the responsibility of updating the registration documents if material changes occur. But
see Feit v. Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp., 332 F. Supp. 544 (E.D.N.Y. 1971). In Leasco,
the issuer's prospectus did not indicate the significance of nor include a specific figure for
nonregulated funds the issuer would be receiving upon gaining control of an insurance company. Id. at 549, 551-52. Although the failure to include the figure constituted a material
omission known to the underwriter, the court held that the underwriter had established a due
diligence defense. Id. at 582. The court reasoned that the underwriter's duty to investigate
should be considered in light of his more limited access to information. However, the Leasco
underwriter made no further inquiries to ascertain subsequent developments during the three
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underwriter becomes aware of facts which strongly suggest that the regis-7
tration materials are deceptive, it must conduct a further investigation.1
In addition, because of its strategic position in the distribution of the
offering, the underwriter is expected to use its influence to correct misstatements and omissions in the registration statement before it goes to the
public."
Recently, underwriters have become concerned with the extension of
the section 11 standard of diligence to '34 Act documents incorporated by
reference into Form S-16. Previously, underwriters were not responsible for
information contained in '34 Act documents and argue that they are not
in a position to ineet their usual standard of care with respect to such
information. 9 Underwriters do not participate in the preparation of the
annual, quarterly and current reports, and proxy material filed pursuant
to the '34 Act and which may be incorporated by reference." Unlike other
registrants who are subject to potential liability for misstatements or omissions on a Form S-16 registration statement, the underwriter cannot control the procedures for preparing these filings. Nor does the underwriter
have the opportunity to review the '34 Act documents prior to filing.5 '
Since the difficult disclosure issues usually are discovered and resolved in
conducting due diligence inquiries during the preparation of a registration
statement," various underwriters claim that they should not be expected
to take equivalent responsibility for the '34 Act filing.-3 A subsequent review of the incorporated '34 Act documents made in conjunction with the
preparation of a Form S-16 registration'statement would not enable an
underwriter to pursue the due diligence procedures normally performed
weeks before the registration statement became effective. Id. at 582-83. Despite the Leasco
court's acknowledgment of the BarChrisstandards, the BarChriscourt's emphasis upon the
updating process renders Leasco difficult to reconcile with BarChris.See H. BLOOMENTHAL,
3A SEcurrMEs AN FEDERAL CoRPoRATE LAW § 8.15(4)(a) (1978).
'1 See Chris-Craft Indus. Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 480 F.2d 341, 370-73 (2d Cir. 1973).
Although the underwriter in Chris-Craftwas not subject to § 11 liability, the court reasoned
that public reliance on the underwriter created obligations similar to due diligence. Id. at 370.
The Chris-Craft registration statement contained no mention of the potential sale of a major
corporate asset. The underwriter, aware that a possible sale had been mentioned in the
corporate minutes, performed no further investigation after questioning company officials
about the possible sale. Id. at 372. The court stated that such notice of deception in the
registration materials required the underwriter to seek further verification either by a careful
search of the records or contacting the prospective buyer. Id. at 371, 373. Thus, failure to do
so went beyond mere negligence and amounted to an abdication of the underwriter's responsibility to protect potential investors. Id. at 373-74.
See Folk, supra note 41, at 55-56; note 42 supra.
" See, e.g., SIA, supra note 31:"
See Release 33-5998, supra note 5; Letter from Sullivan & Cromwell to SEC (Jan. 24,
1979) (SEC File No. S7-763) [hereinafter cited as Sullivan & Cromwell].
" See SIA, supra note 31.
52 See Letter from Goldman, Sachs to SEC (Feb. 9, 1979) (SEC File No. S7-763)
[hereinafter cited as Goldman, Sachs].
0 See, e.g., SIA supra note 31; Sullivan & Cromwell, supra note 50; Letter from Morgan
Stanley & Co. (Jan. 22, 1979) (SEC File No. S7-763) [hereinafter cited as Morgan Stanley].
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during the preparation of a Form S-1 or Form S-7 registration statement.4
In addition to the practical problems of '34 Act disclosures, issuers may
be more reluctant to cooperate with underwriters in preparation of a Form
S-16 registration statement. An underwriter's ability to conduct an adequate due diligence investigation may be hampered by the issuer's expectation that the short form registration procedure will greatly reduce the
complexity, cost and time required for a public offering." In order to protect themselves against the uncertain liability for incorporated documents,
many underwriters contend they would be forced to insist upon costly and
time consuming procedures which would eliminate these economies which
Form S-16 registration is intended to achieve." Besides the addition of
difficult investigative duties, underwriters contend that these duties will
be further complicated by issuers' reluctance to correct, clarify or modify
earlier disclosures in '34 Act documents incorporated by reference. 57 This
reluctance appears to be attributable to the issuer's concern that the subsequent disclosure may be viewed as an admission that the prior document
was materially false or misleading. Therefore, the issuer might subject
himself to '34 Act liability.58 Since amendment in the Form S-16 prospectus of incorporated documents might have a misleading significance, the
issuer's concept of an adequate disclosure may vary markedly from the
underwriter's opinion about the materiality of a misstatement or omission. 59 As a result, many underwriters doubt that their participation in the
preparation of Form S-16 registration statements will result in improved
filings of subsequent '34 Act documents. 0
"

See CurrentIssues and Developments in the Duties and Liabilitiesof Underwritersand

Securities Dealers, 33 Bus. LAW. 335, 356 (1977) [hereinafter cited as CurrentIssues]; Sullivan & Cromwell, supra note 50.
11See Sullivan & Cromwell, supra note 50. Since the adoption of the short form registration statement, the SEC has emphasized that the primary goals of the integration of the '33
Act and '34 Act are the reduction of registration costs, the ability to reach markets more
quickly, and the elimination of duplicative disclosure. See, e.g., Release 33-5923, supra note
5. Various underwriters fear that, in light of these expectations, registrants will become
increasingly reluctant to delay their offering to await an underwriter's due diligence investigation. See Current Issues, supra note 54, at 348-58; Sullivan & Cromwell, supra note 50.
Concurrently, normal competitive forces within the securities industry may encourage use of
Form S-16 by companies whose disclosure has been of lesser caliber. See Letter from Blyth,
Eastman Dillon & Co. to SEC (SEC File No. S7-763).
56 See Letter from ABA Federal Regulation of Securities Committee to SEC (Feb. 22,
1979) (SEC File No. S7-763); Sullivan & Cromwell, supra note 50.
51See Johnson, Expanded Use of Form S-16, PLI TENTH ANNUAL INsTrrurE ON Szcusirrms
REGULATION 65, 67 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Johnson]; Release 33-5998, supra note 5, at
81,059.
See Release 33-5998, supra note 5, at 81,059.
5 See Johnson, supra note 57, at 67; Goldman, Sachs, supra note 52.
10 See SIA, supra note 31. In contrast to the ongoing relationship with the registrant
during the preparation of a Form S-1 or S-7 registration statement, an underwriter preparing
a registration statement on Form S-16 does not have the same opportunity to improve the
form, content and format of disclosure to serve as a model in subsequent filings. Id. Furthermore, underwriters state that their participation in the preparation of '34 Act filings of clients
would not be practical or economically feasible. Id.
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Various underwriters contend that their potential liability for possible
material misstatements or omissions in documents not prepared and presented for purposes of the offerings warrants adoption by the SEC of a safe
harbor rule." An underwriters' petition for rulemaking has requested the
SEC to limit underwriter liability in the S-16 context by establishing relevant factors to be considered in determining the reasonableness of an underwriter's investigation of documents incorporated by reference. 2 Furthermore, underwriters argue that the section 11 standard of due diligence
is flexible because the investigation of a reasonable and prudent man
should vary according to the circumstances." Since the short form contains
little financial disclosure and the underwriter has less influence with the
issuer, underwriters argue that a reasonable investor would not expect a
prudent underwriter to verify incorporated documents with the kind of
painstaking detail customary in traditional underwriting. 4
The SEC has addressed the underwriters' concerns by proposing
amendments to Form S-16 which deal narrowly with specific issues raised
by the underwriters. The SEC proposes that for the purposes of section 11
liability documents incorporated by reference shall be deemed effective as
of the date of each document's filing with the Commission, rather than the
effective date of the registration statement.15 This amendment would protect the issuer and underwriter from liability for an incorporated '34 Act
document which, although accurate at the time of filing, became misleading due to subsequent events. The SEC has stated, however, that an underwriter would still be liable under section 11 of the '33 Act if the disclosures
in the document contained false or misleading statements at the time of
filing which were not superseded or modified in the subsequent Form S-16
registration statement. 6
61 See Morgan Stanley, supra note 53; SIA, supra note 31.
62 See Release 33-5998, supra note 5, at 81,059-60. The Securities Industry Association

submitted two proposed rules to the SEC relating to underwriters' liability with respect to
registration statements on Form S-16. See SIA, supra note 31. The first proposal set forth
relevant circumstances which should be considered in determining whether an underwriter
has made a reasonable investigation. Id. The second proposal deemed an underwriter to have
conducted a reasonable investigation if the underwriter had (a) read the registration statement, including the documents incorporated by reference, (b) discussed the registration
statement with representatives of the issuer, and (c) as a result does not know of any untrue
statement or omission of a material fact. Id.
63 See Current Issues, supra note 54, at 350;
6, Id.
See Release 33-5998, supra note 5, at 81,061. The proposed amendment to Form S-16
clarifying the effective date of documents incorporated by reference (Item 7(e)) states:
(i) For purposes of determining pursuant to Section 11(a) of the Act only when a
document incorporated by reference pursuant to this Item 7 "became effective," the
effective date shall be the date of the document's initial filing with the Commission.
(ii) For all other purposes under the Act, including Section 13, the effective date
shall be the effective date of the registration statement.
Form S-16 Proposed Amendment, reprintedin 2 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 7292, at 6433-34.
66 See Release 33-5998, supra note 5, at 81,061.
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This amendment should not obscure the fact that section 11 would
apply if the disclosure in the registration statement omitted or contained
an untrue statement of a material fact when it became effective." Form
S-16 requires the disclosure of any material changes in the issuer's affairs
occurring after the filing date of the incorporated document and before the
effective date of the S-16 registration statement.6 8 Thus, although the basic
disclosure in Form S-16 is accomplished through the incorporation of specific documents by reference,69 a court should assess the adequacy and
accuracy of the disclosure in the Form S-16 registration statement by
considering the prospectus and incorporated documents as a single entity.
The SEC proposal supports this view by providing that the Form S-16
prospectus, or a subsequent document which has been incorporated, be
deemed to modify or supersede statements in prior documents incorporated by reference. As a practical matter, however, the SEC's distinction
between the effective dates should be helpful. During the course of the due
diligence investigation, the underwriter must review the adequacy and
accuracy of the initial disclosure in the incorporated '34 Act documents to
determine whether corrective disclosures are necessary. If such disclosures
have been made, however, the underwriter must determine whether the
updated information adequately and accurately addresses the untrue
statements or omissions of material fact in the incorporated documents.
In order to encourage issuers to correct earlier disclosure documents incorporated by reference, the SEC proposes that inclusion of a modifying or
superseding statement will not be deemed to be an admission that the
superseded or modified statement constituted a violation of the federal
securities acts when made.71
"

See 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1976).
" See Form S-16 (Item 8), supra note 4.
" See text accompanying notes 12-16 supra.
70 The proposed amendment to Form S-16 (Item 7(f)) states:
Any statement contained in a document incorporated or deemed to be incorporated by reference shall be deemed to be modified or superseded for purposes of the
prospectus to the extent that a statement contained in the prospectus or in any
other subsequently filed document which also is or is deemed to be incorporated
by reference modifies or replaces such statement.
The modifying or superseding statement may, but need not state that it has
modified or superseded a prior statement or include any other information set forth
in the document which is not so modified or superseded.***
Form S-16 Proposed Amendment, reprinted in 2 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 7292, at 6433-35.
The proposed amendment to Form S-16 (Item 7(f)) states:
*** The making of a modifying or superseding statement shall not be deemed
an admission that the modified or superseded statement, when made, constituted
an untrue statement of a material fact; a statement false or misleading with respect
to any material fact; an omission to state a material fact necessary to make a
statement not misleading; or the employment of a manipulative, deceptive, or
fraudulent device, contrivance, scheme, transaction, act, practice, course of business or artifice to defraud***
Form S-16 Proposed Amendment, reprinted in 2 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) $ 7292, at 6433-35.
Underwriters' comments properly question whether this proposal in the text of a SEC form
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Although the amendments to Form S-16 proposed by the SEC address
certain problems caused by the incorporation of documents by reference,
the underwriters' request for clarification of their due diligence obligations
remains unanswered. The SEC remains reluctant to promulgate a rule on
underwriters' liability and due diligence obligation which would have unforeseen ramifications on the degree and quality of underwriter investigation. 2 Thus, the SEC has refused to redress the alleged imbalance in the
statutory liabilities of the two securities acts which has been created by
the integration of the disclosure provisions of the '34 Act with the registration procedures mandated by the '33 Act.7 3 Instead, the SEC believes that
a court would recognize an underwriter's practical difficulties and consider
the circumstances of the underwriter's position with respect to information
contained in the documents incorporated by reference into a Form S-16
registration statement.7 4
Despite the underwriters' difficulties with incorporation by reference
into Form S-16 of '34 Act information, the underwriters' responsibility to
independently verify the information in the registration statement remains
undiminished. Historically, the courts and the SEC have placed the burden of policing the disclosure process in the registration of new securities
on the underwriter. This policy is a result of unmistakable congressional
75
intent and the underwriter's unique role in the offering of securities.
Securities' buyers in an initial distribution do not have the protection of a
continuous scrutiny of a security afforded to purchasers in the trading
markets. Furthermore, new public offerings have a special economic significance because of their impact on the economy. 7 Short form registration
is intended to encourage new securities offerings by facilitating timely
access to the capital markets and reducing the costs of raising capital.7 8
Form S-16 has been viewed as providing quicker access to the capital
would be Iiinding on federal or state rules of evidence. See SIA, supra note 31; ABA, supra
note 56.
7 See Release 33-5998, supra note 5, at 81,060-61.
" See id. The underwriters contend that the nonstatutory intermixing of the '34 Act with
the '33 Act in Form S-16 compels "underwriters to serve a function and subject themselves
to substantial risks of liability in a manner which Congress never envisaged." Sullivan &
Cromwell, supra note 50; see Goldman, Sachs, supra note 52. Furthermore, the liability for
documents incorporated by reference on Form S-16 coerces underwriters to improve the
quality of registrants' '34 Act filings. Underwriters argue that they have neither the statutory
responsibility nor the realistic means to perform this function. See SIA, supra note 31.
1, See Release 33-5998, supra note 5, at 81,060. The SEC suggests that a.court assessing
§ 11 liabilities for a Form S-16 registration statement should consider the presence or absence
of the underwriter's responsibility for the original filing of material incorporated by reference,
as well as other circumstances that might legitimately effect an underwriter's ability to
discharge its due diligence obligation under the '33 Act. Id.
75 See text accompanying notes 40-42 supra.
76 See THE WHEAT REPORT, supra note 15, at 58-60.

n Id. at 60.
78

at 425.

See, e.g., Release 33-5923, supra note 5, at 81,057-58; AvisoRY REPORT, supra note 3,
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market, especially when the issuer believes that time is of the essence71
The business judgment of the issuer, however, does not relieve the underwriter of its responsibility to conduct an adequate due diligence investigation. The requirements of the '33 Act were meant to slow up the procedure
of selling securities, allowing the financial world the opportunity "to acquaint itself with the basic data underlying a security issue and through
that acquaintance to circulate among the buying public some intimation
of its quality.""0 Furthermore, as the SEC has recognized, the Form S-16
requirement of a firm commitment underwriting for primary offerings is a
basis of the investor's expectation that the underwriter will independently
verify the soundness of the offering."
Although the underwriter must perform a due diligence investigation
of the documents incorporated by reference in a Form S-16 registration
statement, the limits of a reasonable investigation remain unclear. The
SEC has suggested that underwriters must carefully review the documents
incorporated by reference to assure that these documents, as well as the
S-16 prospectus, contain no misstatements or omissions and that the facts
disclosed in the documents have not changed materially as of the date of
incorporation." The SEC position appears to be proper despite the failure
to set forth specific criteria and standards of due diligence. 8
Despite underwriters' fears that court decisions have established certain procedures and materials for which the underwriters are specifically
responsible,"4 the section 11 reasonableness standard of "a prudent man in
the management of his own property""5 suggests that a reasonable investigation should vary according to the circumstances. The flexibility of this
standard is limited, however, because neither the public's expectations of
protection by the underwriter nor the underwriter's importance in the
scheme of distribution are diminished when Form S-16 is used. The underwriter has the duty to investigate regardless of the obstacles that the
issuer may put in the way of its access to information.8 7 Previous court
11See

Current Issues, supra note 54, at 352-53; Johnson, supra note 57, at 67.
Landis, The Legislative History of the Securities Act of 1933, 28 GEo. WASH. L. REv.
29, 35 (1959).
SI See notes 20 and 41 supra. The SEC did not restrict the type or amount of the offering
extending the availability of Form S-16 to primary offerings because of the investor protections inherent in a firm commitment underwriting. See Release 33-5923, supra note 5, at
80,247. Furthermore, the SEC intended the $50 million capitalization standard to assure a
general market interest in the securities. See id.; note 19 supra. The need for independent
investigation by an underwriter increases for companies whose market capitalization is near
the S-16 standard. See note 18 supra.
82 See Release 33-5998, supra note 5, at 81,060.
13See note 40 supra.
8, See, e.g., BarChris Dialogue, supra note 22; Messer, supra note 40, at 442-44; Whitney,
Underwriters'Counsel-Advice to My Client: "That Which is Impossible Must Go Away" in
Symposium, The BarChris Case: Prospectus Liability, 24 Bus. LAW. 523, 585 (Jan. 1969).
0 '33 Act § 11(c), 15 U.S.C. § 77k(c)(1976).
88 See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 35, at 9.
87 See ALI FEDERAL SECURrTIES CODE, comment 10(d), at 104 (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1973).
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decisions under section 11 have assessed a defendant's defense of due diligence in light of the particular issuer, the issue, and the defendant's role
in the preparation of the registration statement.'8 Therefore, judicial consideration of an underwriter's investigation of a document incorporated by
reference would take the underwriter's problematic position into account.89
While the underwriter's position in a S-16 offering demands the imposition of a due diligence standard, such a standard for investigating incorporated '34 Act documents remains distinct from the due diligence required
in the preparation of all the registration materials." Such due diligence
requires the underwriter to do more than read and analyze the incorporated documents." The underwriter must independently verify the information contained in these documents and must investigate further any
possible discrepancies of which he has been put on notice.2 Such notice
may arise from any facts known to the underwriter, as well as from an
examination of corporate records, particularly corporate minutes and
major contracts. 3 Furthermore, the issuer has established a managerial
and financial history through the reporting of disclosure materials. Since
the underwriter usually does not enter into a firm commitment underwriting without an investigation of the issuer, 4 knowledge of circumstances
demanding independent verification would be available to the underwriter
from sources other than solely the documents incorporated by reference.
Finally, courts have emphasized that disclosure in the registration statement must present the current status of the issuer as of the effective date
of the registration statement. 5 The problems attributable to documents
incorporated by reference in Form S-16 are less consequential since incorporated documents merely form the starting point of an underwriter's
investigation of potential material changes in the issuer's affairs.
The underwriters' difficulties caused by the incorporated documents in
Form S-16 apparently signify the limits of the SEC's efforts to administratively integrate the disclosure provisions of the '34 Act and '33 Act. The
SEC's attempt to achieve economies of time and cost in the registration
of securities is limited by the specific statutorily created civil liabilities
and defenses of section 11 of the '33 Act. In light of the imperfect integration of the Acts, the underwriters' responsibility to protect the investing
public by conducting a due diligence investigation must necessarily over"See, e.g., Feit v. Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp., 332 F. Supp. 544 (E.D.N.Y.
1971); Escott v. BarChris Constr. Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
11See Sanders v. John Nuveen & Co., 524 F.2d 1064, 1071 (7th Cir. 1975) (nature of
investors' interest affects nature of underwriter's investigation), vacated, 425 U.S. 929 (1976)
(remanded in light of Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976)).
90 See text accompanying notes 43-48 supra.
, See 524 F.2d at 1070-71.
2 See notes 45 and 47 supra.
" See, e.g., Escott v. BarChris Constr. Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643, 694-97 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
" See SPECIAL REPoRT, supra note 41, at 512-13.
" See note 46 supra.

